




Towards a new Atlanticism
JOE BURTON1
Introduction
I n the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic new questions are being raised about how the transatlantic alliance can survive, adapt and evolve to meet the challenges of an increasingly turbulent cen-
tury. NATO has initiated the NATO2030 process, a  timely re-evalu-
ation of its role in international affairs, and the European Union is 
implementing a range of new defence initiatives (EDF, PESCO, CARD) 
as well as developing a  ‘Strategic Compass’, which aims to forge 
1 Research for this chapter received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 844129.
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a common threat perception across the EU membership. A renewed 
focus on strategic culture undergirds these new initiatives. In 2017, 
President Emmanuel Macron urged Europe to develop a  common 
strategic culture underpinned by new capabilities.2 More recently, 
HR/VP Josep Borrell has called for a  “shared strategic culture and 
empathy to understand the different points of view” of EU member 
states,3 and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 
said, “I believe we also need a PESCO in foreign policy – and a com-
mon strategic culture. There is no military short-cut to a sustainable 
order of peace.”4 In the 2020 Annual Report on CSDP, the European 
Parliament (EP) argued that, in order to achieve strategic autonomy, 
the EU needed to forge “a genuine strategic culture” by developing 
“adaptable, modular instruments which help bring strategic cultures 
closer together.”5
Despite the declarative political will to build a  more cohesive 
European strategic culture, there are some difficult questions to be 
answered. What is the current state of European strategic culture? 
What purposes will a new strategic culture serve? Will it translate into 
more effective political action in the field of security? And how will it 
be fostered and measured? The recent statements by EU leaders sug-
gest different understandings of the concept. Throughout Europe’s 
history, it has been a difficult task to develop a strategic culture from 
the top down in a complex and diverse continent.6 If European strate-
gic culture becomes more culturally distinct, and resultantly, differ-
ent from the United States, this could adversely affect transatlantic 
relations. Despite a  shared desire for enhanced European strate-
gic autonomy, embedding cultural differences does not seem to 
2 M. Emmanuel Macron, President of France, Speech at the Sorbonne, September 29, 2017, 
http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-
europe-18583.html.
3 European Parliament, Hearing with High Representative/Vice President designate Josep Borrell, 
October 7, 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190926IPR62260/
hearing-with-high-representative-vice-president-designate-josep-borrell.
4 Sumi Somaskanda, “Sounding the Alarm Bells”, Berlin Policy Journal, February 16, 2018, https://
berlinpolicyjournal.com/sounding-the-alarm-bells/
5 European Parliament, Annual report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy, (Rapporteur: Arnaud Danjean), 2020.
6 Asle Toje, America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain (London: 
Routledge, 2008).
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be a  constructive way to forge a  closer alliance to meet the myriad 
challenges Europe and America will have to face together in the dec-
ades ahead.
In addressing these questions this chapter advances an argument 
for a transatlanticist strategic culture rather than a Eurocentric one. 
This would involve Europe working together with the US and Canada 
to embed common ideas, behaviours and practices within and be-
tween its defence and security establishments, and a  conscious at-
tempt to bridge ideational and behavioural divides that currently exist 
between the US and Europe. In outlining the benefits of such an ap-
proach, the chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part defines and 
introduces strategic culture as an analytical tool for understanding 
nation states, alliances and international organisations. The second 
part outlines some of the historical problems experienced in building 
a European strategic culture and makes the argument that a transat-
lantic strategic culture is both possible and preferable. The last sec-
tion outlines how transatlantic strategic culture could be rejuvenated 
in a more concerted and collective way between the US and European 
allies, including through EU and NATO channels, military education, 
public diplomacy, and transatlantic strategic-cultural exchanges.
Why strategic culture matters
Strategic culture can be defined as the “sum total  of ideals, condi-
tional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that 
members of the national strategic community have acquired through 
instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to 
strategy.”7 Strategic culture scholarship emerged in the late 1970s as 
a response to the tendency to view Cold War foreign policy as a prod-
uct of systemic structural characteristics (including the balance of 
power and material capabilities) and rational decision-making. These 
approaches failed to explain anomalies in how the great powers acted, 
including instances in which they seemed to act irrationally, and/or 
7 Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, R-2154-AF (Santa 
Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 9. 
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contrary to their national interests. In Vietnam, for example, a con-
flict that Europeans resisted becoming involved in, the long-held be-
lief that America could win any war inhibited the US government from 
seeing the reality of their situation: that they were losing. In Cuba, in 
1962, Khrushchev failed to recognise an idea and principle embedded 
in US political culture for centuries: the Monroe Doctrine; a  deeply 
held aversion to any foreign involvement in the western hemisphere. 
Understanding strategic culture was therefore integral to avoiding 
crises, entangling conflicts and even nuclear war.
Fast forward to the post-Cold War era, 
and strategic culture can help to explain 
a  number of issues that are pertinent to 
European and transatlantic security. The 
disagreement between the US and European 
states over the Iraq War (2003), for exam-
ple, pointed to their broader behaviour-
al and ideational differences.8 These included a long-held American 
focus on war, power politics, punitive sanctions, and interventions 
(especially pertinent in the context of the George W. Bush presiden-
cy), and a preference in some European states (France and Germany 
in particular) for patient diplomacy, rules and regulations, as well as 
crisis management based on persuasion and incentives rather than 
the use of force.9 Strategic culture also helps explain differences in 
threat perception among the allies. Nations view threats through cul-
tural and historical lenses, coloured by previous social interactions 
with both friends and adversaries, and according to preconceived 
ideas. As recent research has highlighted, there are big differences 
in threat perception within Europe,10 and indeed in the transatlantic 
area. According to the strategic culture approach, these differences 
result as much from ideas as from variations in geography and mate-
rial capabilities.
8 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred J. 
Knopf, 2003).
9 Bernard E. Brown, “Are Americans from Mars, Europeans from Venus?”, American Foreign Policy 
Interests, no. 24, 2002, pp. 481-89, p. 481. 
10 Daniel Fiott, “Uncharted territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass 
for EU security and defence”, EUISS Brief no. 16, July 2020, https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/
uncharted-territory-towards-common-threat-analysis-and-strategic-compass-eu-security-
and. 
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The latest US cybersecurity strategy, for example, is based on the 
idea of “defending forward” through “persistent engagement” with 
US adversaries.11 The US is committed to using offensive operations to 
disrupt adversaries beyond US borders, projecting power through cy-
berspace, and establishing a forward operating presence in adversary 
networks to deter cyber-attacks so that the US does not have to fight 
a cyber war ‘at home’. If this sounds familiar, these types of ideas have 
been a constant feature of US defence policy throughout much of its 
history. In this sense, US cybersecurity strategy is not only a reaction 
to the cybersecurity threats at hand, but the confluence of a powerful 
stream of historical behaviours. The same could be said of the EU’s 
approach to cyber. The EU’s cybersecurity strategy is more defen-
sive, more regulatory and legalistic, more oriented towards economic 
markets, based on resilience rather than deterrence and disruption, 
and much more normative, including encouraging responsible state 
behaviour. While some states in Europe are developing offensive ca-
pabilities, the overarching EU approach to cyber security is informed 
by and a product of history, political cultures and ideas and behav-
iours embedded in its institutions.
These examples show that strategic culture is more than just the 
way threats are perceived and includes the way actors behave. The 
antimilitarism that continues to exert a strong influence in German 
foreign policy, for example, is a result of a political culture accumu-
lated over seven decades after World War II. This helps to explain the 
constancy of Germany’s international behaviour in the post-Cold War 
era and how long-established patterns are not easy to change or dis-
rupt. However, strategic culture can also form an exogenous context 
in which actors’ interests are shaped. This approach suggests that in-
ternational organisations such as the EU and NATO can and do create 
a  political/cultural context that shapes their members’ behaviours, 
beliefs (and even their interests). This aspect of how strategic cultures 
evolve is important because forging or instrumentalising strategic 
culture is exactly what European leaders are now proposing to do.
11 Jeff Kosseff, “The Contours of ‘Defend Forward’ Under International Law,” in Thomas Minárik, 
Slim Alatalu, Stefano Biondi et al (eds.) 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent 
Battle (Tallin: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2019). 
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The US and Europe – 
A world apart?
In recent references to European strategic culture, there has been 
a lack of attention to the seemingly obvious question: do we not have 
a strategic culture already? In fact, references to European strategic 
culture stretch back through much of Europe’s post-Cold War histo-
ry. In 2003, Javier Solana talked about the EU needing a  European 
strategic culture that “fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, ro-
bust intervention”.12 This begs other questions: what has happened 
since then? If the new European leadership are arguing for a  new 
strategic culture now, how will it be different from what Solana was 
proposing? What has happened to European strategic culture in the 
intervening years that makes such a change necessary?
Perhaps the first reason for a  lack of 
progress has been a  broad resistance to 
militarising and securitising the EU’s role 
in the world. In other words, the EU has 
a culture, but it is not particularly strategic. 
As the EU seeks greater strategic autono-
my, the ability to act militarily independ-
ent of the US and pursues a  more robust 
role in security alongside NATO, this will 
necessarily involve new military capabili-
ties (PESCO/EDF), increased defence-in-
dustrial investment, dedicated defence budgets (notably through 
EDF), and even its own military command. These processes are viewed 
by some on the continent as the antithesis of what the EU was set up 
to do – to preserve peace – and by others as unnecessarily duplicative 
of NATO. These historical dynamics help explain why there has been 
resistance to reforming CSDP to give it a more robust role in security 
12 Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress 
Report, International Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4, Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2005.
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and why the EU Battlegroups have never been deployed.13 As analysts 
have pointed out as far back as 2005, a  European strategic culture 
without the requisite military capabilities to draw on, will ring hollow.14
Another aspect to clarify about European 
strategic culture is that it has sometimes 
been used to serve national interests rather 
than collective ones. Such an approach can 
of course erode solidarity. NATO histori-
cally has embodied multiple strategic cul-
tures, but through consensus-based deci-
sion-making and inclusivity of smaller 
powers,15 these cultural divides have been reconciled. In this context, 
there are already some recent attempts to establish a European stra-
tegic culture, but it is questionable whether they are a  good fit for 
a more transatlantic or indeed Europe-wide agenda for security and 
defence. Perhaps the most prominent example is the European 
Intervention Initiative (EI2),16 a grouping of 14 states17 which aims to 
build a strategic culture on which military operations could be based.18 
While a strategic culture based on conducting more autonomous mil-
itary operations is consistent with the EU’s level of ambition in the EU 
Global Strategy, limiting European strategic culture to a purely oper-
ational approach would seem to be an overly narrow application of 
the concept. The initiative appears to be based around the idea of pri-
oritising effectiveness over inclusiveness and remains outside both 
NATO and EU structures and by invitation only. If the initiative is 
a  vehicle that mainly serves French priorities in the Sahel and the 
13 Michael Vincent, “EU Battlegroups: The European ‘army’ that politicians can’t agree how to use”, 
ABC News, November 16, 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-17/the-european-army-
that-has-never-been-in-a-fight/10506466.
14 Op. Cit., “The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report”, p. 802. 
15 The Harmel Review (1966) was perhaps the most famous example.
16 Christian Molling and Claudia Major, “Why Joining France’s European Intervention Initiative is 




17 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Romania.
18 It is useful to distinguish between strategic culture and military culture here. The latter refers to 
the values, ideas and behaviours developed in militaries themselves. Strategic culture is a bigger 
concept, involving nations, international organisations, and wider policymaking processes.
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Mediterranean, then it is unlikely to overcome ideational and behav-
ioural divides within Europe which are among the reasons why 
European strategic culture remains underdeveloped. These include 
differences over European integration itself, the extent of EU defence 
cooperation in light of NATO’s role and prominence, the nature and 
scope of strategic/humanitarian interventions, the threat from and 
response to terrorism, and different ideas around sovereignty, bor-
ders, migration, and democracy promotion.19
The EU’s recent Strategic Compass ini-
tiative may help bridge the gaps in threat 
perception that exist on the continent, but, 
as analysts have pointed out, its meaning 
remains unclear and it is driven by Brussels 
rather than the member states.20 The re-
lationship this process would have with 
existing EU security policies is also unde-
termined, and identifying and analysing 
threats is not the same as developing common positions and policies 
to address them. As others have argued, the Strategic Compass in-
itiative could lead to duplications and turf wars instead of aligning 
perceptions on security issues.21
A bridge to the US?
Given the inherent and historical problems in developing a European 
strategic culture, could a  more transatlantic-focused approach be 
possible, even in the context of seemingly unprecedented tensions 
between the US and Europe? An important point in favour of such an 
argument is that the strategic cultures of the EU and US have already 
coexisted and overlapped for decades and have led to sustained secu-
rity cooperation. These underlying foundations have not disappeared 
19 For a comprehensive view see: Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas (eds.) Strategic 
Cultures in Europe Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent (Springer, 2013).
20 Sven Biscop, “From Global Strategy to Strategic Compass: Where Is the EU Heading?”, Egmont 
Security Brief, no. 121, December 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep21401.pdf.
21 Nicole Koenig, “The EU’s strategic compass for security and defence: Just another paper?”, Policy 
Paper, Hertie School, Jacques Delors Centre, July 2020.
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as a  result of Trump’s efforts to disrupt them. In fact, the idea of 
Atlanticism has helped hold the alliance together during the Trump 
administration. The bipartisan resolution introduced in the US House 
of Representatives prohibiting appropriation or use of funds to with-
draw from NATO, and a  resolution prohibiting withdrawal without 
the approval of two-thirds of the Senate, were prominent examples.22 
87% of Republican and 94% of Democrat foreign policy leaders and 
experts supported either the increase or the maintenance of the US 
commitment to NATO.23
It is also crucial to note that strategic cultures are not monolithic 
national constructs that are inflexible and unable to adapt and change. 
One of the more important developments in strategic culture theory 
has been the development of a  literature on strategic subcultures.24 
This work recognises there are different cultural streams within 
a country, not one monolithic set of behaviour and ideas. While there 
may be a great deal of concern and consternation in Europe due to the 
Trump presidency, a culturally informed reading of Trump’s foreign 
policy suggests that it is not unprecedented, but symptomatic and re-
flective of deeper trends in American political culture, including 
wanting to be free of ‘entangling alliances’, US exceptionalism, and 
long-established Jacksonian25 impulses in US foreign policy, includ-
ing populism, white nationalism and the assertive defence of US in-
terests.26 Trump is representative of one subculture in US politics that 
does not always (or indeed often) dominate the political landscape. If 
former Vice President Biden secures the presidency in November 2020, 
there could be a swift change in US foreign and security policy. Biden 
has committed to healing the divide in the transatlantic alliance, im-
plementing a  new partnership for democracy, forging ahead with 
multilateral solutions to security issues, and being consciously and 
22 Jordan Tama, Joshua Busby et al., “Congress has NATO’s back, despite Trump’s unilateralism”, 
Washington Post, April 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/03/congress-
has-natos-back-despite-trumps-unilateralism/
23 Ibid.
24 Alan Bloomfield, “Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture 
Debate”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 33, no. 3, 2012, pp. 437-61.
25 Related to the policies of Andrew Jackson, 7th president of the United States.
26 Anna Dimitrova, “Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy: The Resurgence of the Jacksonian 
Tradition?”, L’Europe en Formation, no. 382, 2017, pp. 33-46. 
84 Turning the tide  | How to rescue transatlantic relations
purposively internationalist as opposed to isolationist and protec-
tionist.27 These ideas are not just the policies of a Democrat presiden-
tial candidate, but the reflection of a more Atlanticist subculture that 
includes many Republicans, and which also exists as a subculture in 
many European countries, and indeed in Canada.28
It may feel like Europe and the United 
States are far apart at the moment, but, 
if strategic culture is about how deci-
sion-makers or elites view and perceive 
strategic affairs (ideas), there is actual-
ly a  great deal of convergence across the 
Atlantic. There is already an Atlanticist 
culture at play in Europe based on “a shared normative understand-
ing of a Western-led international order; a belief in the importance 
of the US in European security; and a preference for NATO as a plat-
form for coordinating force planning and operational deployment.”29 
Crucially, countries that exhibit Atlanticism contribute more to NATO 
burden sharing.30 Perhaps more importantly, US leadership has been 
essential to European peace and security for over a century. In Bosnia, 
Kosovo, in fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan, and more re-
cently, in opposing Chinese expansion and Russian aggression, the 
US has been a galvanising influence as often as a divisive one. With 
the exception of President Trump, US presidents have invariably 
been committed to European integration and cooperation, and peo-
ple-to-people links between communities on the two continents are 
as important and strong as any other factor of transatlantic politics.31 
This history suggests that the US, under a different administration, 
27 Joseph R. Biden, jnr, “Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing US Foreign Policy After 
Trump,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again.
28 Ronald D. Asmus and Alexandr Vondra, “The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe”, 
Review of International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 2, 2005.
29 Jordan Becker and Edmund J. Malesky, “The Continent or the ‘Grand Large?’ Strategic Culture and 
Operational Burden Sharing in NATO,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 1 (2017): pp. 163-
80. 
30 Bryan Frizzelle, “What makes a reliable ally? a fresh perspective on NATO, strategic culture and 
collective defense,” War on Rocks, January 19, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/makes-
reliable-ally-fresh-perspective-nato-strategic-culture-collective-defense/
31 Rachel Rizzo, “The Transatlantic Relationship: A Call to the Next Generation,” Heinrich Boll 
Foundation, July 30, 2020, https://eu.boell.org/en/2020/07/30/transatlantic-relationship-call-
next-generation.
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could again play a  decisive leadership role in building a  stronger 
transatlantic strategic culture and overcoming some of the fragmen-
tation and barriers inherent in Europe-centric approaches.
Transatlantic strategic culture: 
pitfalls and opportunities
How, then, do we rejuvenate and instrumentalise a common transat-
lantic strategic culture to better serve transatlantic defence and secu-
rity? And what frameworks, mechanisms, and cultural milieu are best 
suited for the task?
The first pathway forward is to have serious and sustained dis-
cussions about the threats the alliance faces, with a view to building 
common threat perceptions. Issues to focus on must include China, 
Russia, terrorism, cyber threats, emerging technologies, climate and 
energy security, and the spaces and interconnections between them. 
NATO needs to lead this effort, especially as it has historically act-
ed as an agent in strategic culture building, by emphasising collec-
tive defence of the transatlantic area over national defence (itself an 
anti-populist and anti-nationalist message), and through socialis-
ing new members to the norms, practices and ideas of the alliance.32 
Teaching and persuasion were an integral part of the NATO enlarge-
ment process, and helped to embed liberal democratic ideas and be-
haviours (the key elements of strategic culture) in the post-commu-
nist states.33 NATO could be doing the same thing again.
More specifically, the NATO2030 process, and the mutual con-
struction of a new Strategic Concept, are prime avenues through which 
this could be achieved. NATO2030 could take a strategic approach to 
developing a transatlantic strategic culture and assess where and how 
ideas about security currently diverge and converge. This could in-
volve a deeper debate around the meaning of transatlantic solidarity 
32 Alexandra Gherciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe’”, 
International Organization, vol. 59, no. 4, 2005, pp. 973-1012. 
33 Ibid, p. 977.
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and the virtues of alliances themselves and even be linked to the EU’s 
Strategic Compass Initiative.34 If EU-NATO cooperation is a  serious 
process then working towards complementary strategic cultures 
through these mechanisms should also be possible.
The advent of new high-level strategic dialogues is also a promis-
ing avenue for forging common ideas and behaviour, including the 
EU-US High-Level Dialogue on China.35 These should not be seen as 
a short-term solution but part of an ongoing process of strategic cul-
ture rejuvenation. At the non-governmental level, if a strategic cul-
ture is going to be built that helps to align ideas and behaviours, the 
network of defence universities and colleges throughout the transat-
lantic area are also a vehicle for change. The role education plays as an 
avenue for instrumentalising strategic culture is vital and these or-
ganisations have important effects, including shaping ideas and be-
liefs, as well as the practices of military officers, including interaction 
with non-military security actors.36
Recognising the challenges of building 
a strategic culture from the top down, there 
are also public diplomacy channels that 
could be used to extend and reinforce com-
mon ideas, behaviours and practices across 
the transatlantic space. Public diplomacy 
gets less attention in transatlantic policy 
than it should, but it presents clear oppor-
tunities and advantages, despite the pres-
sure on the public diplomacy budgets and institutional capacities of 
the US Department of State, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and 
the new European External Action Service public diplomacy unit. 
Identifying opinion formers and shapers at the national level, in aca-
demia, and civil society, who are positively disposed to NATO and the 
Atlantic alliance, has proved an effective way to promote the value of 
34 Thierry Tardy, “The internal nature of the Alliance’s cohesion”, NDC Policy Brief no. 1, October 2018, 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1204.
35 US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, “A New Transatlantic Dialogue”, Speech at the German 
Marshall Fund’s Brussels Forum, June 25, 2020, https://www.state.gov/a-new-transatlantic-
dialogue/
36 Tamir Libel, “From the sociology of the (military) profession to the sociology of (security) 
expertise: The case of European national defence universities.,” Defence Studies, vol. 19, no. 1, 2019, 
pp. 62-84.
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Atlanticism before, not least through Atlantic associations and young 
leaders’ fora.
Moving this process beyond conven-
tional governmental channels will be im-
portant. Emerging Atlantic leaders could be 
travelling to the Trump supporters’ heart-
lands to engage in dialogue with Americans 
– this could help break perceptions that 
Europeans are elitist, technocrats and free riders, and facilitate a dia-
logue on how NATO has advanced security and protected their coun-
tries from very real threats. The process could be reciprocated, and 
instrumentalised in a  new EU-NATO public diplomacy programme 
that is based on building allied solidarity beyond the halls of power 
of Brussel and Washington. The people who are most sceptical, and 
prone to accept free riding narratives, or depictions of NATO as an 
aggressive and militaristic organisation, need to be persuaded of its 
positive impact. Malicious narratives need to be countered from the 
bottom up, especially in an era of social media subversion. If anyone 
doubts the relevance of the internet in shaping ideas about NATO, 
then one only needs to look at the propaganda website, the Strategic 
Culture Foundation, to realise the importance of vigorous public di-
plomacy to defend how the alliance is framed by its adversaries. Russia 
and China are clearly fuelling anti-EU, US and NATO narratives, and 
in doing so are building and sustaining anti-Atlanticist subcultures 
within Europe.37
NATO’s own institutions and affiliated bodies could also do more 
to align ideas and threat perceptions around security issues. There 
are the centres of excellence, which already host officials on se-
condment from across the transatlantic area, and which could be 
used more strategically to discuss areas of convergence and diver-
gence between Europe and North America. NATO’s Allied Command 
Transformation processes also constitute a potentially useful avenue. 
The Strategic Foresight Analysis process, which identifies threats 
to the alliance across a  longer timeline to 2025, the Future Alliance 
Operations Process (FFAO) and NATO Defence Planning Process could 
37 Alliance for Securing Democracy, “Hamilton 2.0 Dashboard,” 2020, https://securingdemocracy.
gmfus.org/hamilton-dashboard/
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be instrumentalised more strategically to build common ideas, in-
cluding involving other institutions such as the EU.38
Finally, strategic culture building needs to go beyond national 
militaries, or operations, and include conversations with civil soci-
ety, the tech and defence industries, and the general public. Strategy 
itself involves a  broader range of actors and has moved beyond the 
use of military force and coercion. Strategic culture building must 
do the same.
Conclusion
To many supporters of the transatlantic alliance the future of trans-
atlantic relations looks bleak. If President Trump wins another term 
in November 2020, we could be talking about the end of NATO. But it 
will not be the end of Atlanticism. A clear reading of history reveals 
there has been a  tendency to characterise the alliance as in crisis 
throughout its existence, while ignoring dynamics that keep the al-
liance strong, including its self-healing tendencies,39 strong support 
for it across the Atlantic at both the elite and public levels, and the 
enduring strength and relevance of its members’ common identity, 
values and interests.40 This analysis has suggested that one pathway 
towards keeping the transatlantic partnership strong is to focus on 
instrumentalising an Atlanticist strategic culture. This is an ambi-
tious task, and one prone to volatile electoral politics and the forces 
of populism and nationalism. But there is a path forward for the com-
munity of people who believe the US, Canada and Europe can continue 
to shape the international environment in ways that will enhance our 
collective security and increase the levels of peace and prosperity in 
the international system.
38 Murielle Delaporte, “NATO’s Backstage: Working the “3 Cs” Rules at Allied Command 
Transformation”, Defense.info, April 21, 2018, https://defense.info/featured-story/2018/04/natos-
backstage-working-the-3-cs-rules-at-allied-command-transformation/
39 Wallace J. Thies, Why NATO Endures (Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
40 Joe Burton, NATO’s Durability in a Post-Cold War World (New York: SUNY Press, 2018).

